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John Arquilla
Department of Defense Analysis, United States Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA
ABSTRACT
While studies of technology andwar abound, the processes and reasoning that
undergird choices about what to emphasize—i.e., “technology strategy”—
have receivedmuch less attention. This analysis focuses upon the caseofGrand
Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, who had a virtually free hand in setting German
naval development strategy during the decades leading up to the outbreak
ofWorldWar I. As significant technological advances characterized this period,
Tirpitz’s strategic choices from among a range of promising options comprise
a fruitful subject of inquiry. That the current era features similarly significant
technological advances and opportunities implies the possibility of drawing
useful insights from the study of technology strategy in this earlier time.
For all the analyses of the shifts in military and security affairs wrought by the Industrial Revolution, and
themany studies of conflict in today’s InformationAge, there is one aspect of this field of inquiry that still
suffers from some neglect: the matter of “technology strategy.” To be sure, there are several outstanding
examinations of the manner in which technological change affects warfighting, not least the sweeping
overviews like those provided by Martin van Creveld’s Technology and War and Max Boot’s War Made
Knew.1 But these and others tend to focus on how new tools have been used in battle and have enabled
the pursuit of strategic aims, rather than on the process by which hard choices are made about which
technologies to emphasize, which to relegate to realms of lesser importance. It is this selection process,
pursued in peacetime and war, that lies at the heart of technology strategy.
To some degree, it is no doubt the common emphasis of the great philosophers of war on the clash
of arms that has contributed to the relative neglect of the strategies that have guided the choice of which
weapons to acquire. Carl von Clausewitz, for example, saw strategy as simply, if all too vaguely, definable
as “the use of engagements for the object of war.” His listing of the elements of strategy—“moral, physi-
cal, mathematical, geographical, and statistical”—does not include a technological component. Indeed,
Clausewitz goes on to undermine the importance of his list of strategic elements by assuming broad
technology parity and the implications thereof: “armies are comparable in equipment … The first rule,
therefore, should be: put the largest possible army in thefield.” The conclusion he draws, ultimately, is that
“[a]n impartial student of modern war must admit that superior numbers are becoming more decisive
with each passing day.”2
The American navalist Alfred Thayer Mahan also took a broad view of strategy in almost all its
elements—save for the technological domain. Indeed, his studies, which did so much to guide global
naval thought leading up to and through theworldwars—andbeyond, including to this day—deliberately
took the view that technological advances might change tactics, but not strategy. Thus, Mahan used
lessons of the age of sail to inform the study of sea power in an industrial age because, as he put it, “the
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steamship of our own time has increased the scope and the rapidity of naval operations without neces-
sarily changing the principles which should direct them.”3
Beyond Clausewitz and Mahan, however, there have been some who have pointed to the importance
of figuring out exactly which technological path to take. Perhaps the strongest statement of the rationale
for studying this dimension of strategy came from J.F.C. Fuller, one of the fathers of modern maneuver
warfare: “Tools, or weapons, if only the right ones can be discovered, form 99 percent of victory.”4 Fuller
first wrote these words two months after the end of World War I, a time when many military-related
technologies were just beginning to mature.
Some analyses of why certain technological choices were made before and during World War II have
looked deeply into the question of how the tools of war have influenced military doctrine and organi-
zational designs. For example, Barry Posen noted that Germany’s need, given its expansionist aims, was
to have a force capable of winning short, sharp campaigns against a group of powerful adversaries likely
to rise up and resist aggression.5 On another tack, Richard Overy looked at flawed German technology
strategy during the war, especially the opportunity costs associated with efforts to field modest numbers
of first-generation jets and missiles. The Nazis failed because they tried to win a war of the 1940s “with
the weapons of the 1950s … a technical disaster.”6
Clearly, the decades before World War II, and the war years themselves, have provided fertile mate-
rial for the examination of various technology strategies. So, too, have the years since. The New Look of
the U.S. military in the 1950s, for example, reflected the potentially profound organizational and doc-
trinal implications of the emergence of nuclear weapons. In the event, however, the New Look fizzled.7
As did the “vertical envelopment” doctrine that arose from advances in helicopter technology a decade
later—and which became the key element in tactical mobility of ground forces in Vietnam. The extreme
vulnerability of helicopters to ground fire—some 4,000 of them were shot down in the Southeast Asian
theater—suggests that therewere serious flaws both at the level of technology strategy and field doctrine.8
Even as the situation in Southeast Asia was unraveling, some serious, prescient efforts arose to help
think through the manner in which a strategic approach to technological advances could affect military
and security affairs. Perhaps the most influential of these works was the study by Stefan Possony and
Jerry Pournelle that advanced the view that “the decisive war” was well underway long before the start of
the shooting, when choices about just which weapons, transport, and information systems to emphasize
were being made.9 A decade after their study, in 1983, the Reagan administration followed up on this
themewith the launching of Project Socrates, a classified initiative aimed at developing the first “national
technology strategy policy.”10 But this project fell into neglect after the end of the Cold War, and for the
past quarter-century it has been hard to find evidence of a coherent American initiative in this realm.
Needless to say, though, technology strategy remains a very highly relevant concern—and other coun-
tries have been thinking deeply about such matters. China in particular has shown in recent decades a
deep sensitivity to various issues related to technology strategy.11 But for all the many opportunities to
study technology strategy—from the interwar period of the 1920s–1930s to the present—there may still
be reason to look back at World War I. This too was a time when technologies were rapidly changing,
particularly in naval affairs. And, given the bloody stalemates on the land fronts in that awful war, which
devolved into an extended, resource-dependent war of attrition, events at sea were of profound impor-
tance. Indeed, the Allied blockade of Germany was perhaps the principal cause of victory in 1918. John
Keegan described the effectiveness of the naval stranglehold succinctly: “Hunger, even more than the
threat of a full-scale invasion, was the measure that would eventually bring the German republic to sign
the peace treaty on 23 June 1919.”12 Thus, there is a powerful rationale for focusing on naval technology
strategy before and during this war.
The curious case of Alfred von Tirpitz
In the long history of naval affairs, few individuals have ever been able to exert a controlling influ-
ence over policy and strategy for sustained periods. Jean-Baptiste Colbert served Louis XIV long and
well as state secretary for the navy (1668–1683), but was more an administrator than a strategist of
sea power. The U.S. Navy’s Admiral Hyman Rickover oversaw political, technological, and conceptual
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issues for several decades, but primarily as they bore upon matters closely related to the building of his
beloved “Nuclear Navy.” Admiral Sergei Gorshkov had a similarly long run as head of the Soviet Navy
(1956–1985), built it up creatively during his time to challenge theAmerican andNATOnavies, but never
took it to war against them. Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz,Wilhelmine Germany’s state secretary for
naval affairs, stands virtually alone, it seems, as one who spent decades (1897–1916) as an administrator,
political champion, and war leader, first building an excellent navy virtually from scratch, then testing it
in battle against Britain, the leading sea power of the day.
Given the high position he held and the amount of time for which he served, Tirpitz’s tenure is
worth examining. Especially because, even now, the historical record of naval events during World War
I remains open to debate. Germany lost the war, and the British naval blockade played a big role in this
outcome. But the battle fleet that Tirpitz built inflicted very serious damage on the Royal Navy at Jutland,
whose centennial has recently been observed. And his U-boats came within an ace of starving Britain
into submission. It is natural, then, to ask whether Tirpitz made good use of the time and resources that
he had been granted.
Some scholars, like Correlli Barnett, have argued that, with the building of the High Sea Fleet, “the
Germans drove the British into alliance with their enemies, without as a compensation being able to
defend German overseas colonies and trade.” Barnett goes on to conclude that “the basic truth about the
High Sea Fleet is that it should never have been built.”13
Perhaps so, but Tirpitz can hardly be faulted for following the wishes of a head of state who wanted
his country to become a sea power and a legislature that so eagerly made resources available, over
a period of many years. Besides, as historian Paul Kennedy has argued, the fault for the rise of the
deep Anglo-German naval antagonism was not confined to just one party, noting that “if the German
threat appeared intolerable to the British, the latter’s response was equally intolerable to the German
navalists … In mutually striving for that ‘manifest strength,’ the Germans and the British each con-
tributed to the arms spiral.”14
However, even taking into consideration the points that Tirpitz was fulfilling the wishes of his Kaiser
and that the British might have been just as culpable for the arms race, one must still closely consider the
manner in which he employed such high-level sponsorship and the major German resources devoted to
building a navy. This indeed is fair game for critical analysis.
And even a preliminary survey, such as that undertaken in this study, raises very serious questions
about the “technology strategy” Tirpitz pursued. He aimed at building a battle fleet of all-big-gun dread-
noughts that was intended to reach to about two-thirds the size of its British counterpart, the idea being
that the smaller fleet’s sheer ability to inflict great damage—even in defeat—would serve to deter British
intervention in a continental conflict. Yet the very existence of and looming threat posed by the High Sea
Fleet failed to keep Britain out of the war in August 1914, when German field armies violated Belgian
neutrality—an action that was required by the Schlieffen Plan’s key flanking movement. Thus, Tirpitz’s
“risk theory” of deterrence failed from the outset.
Then there is the matter of submarines. Tirpitz contended, in his Memoirs, that he built few sub-
marines (just over two dozen were available at the start of the GreatWar) because of their short range. He
said: “I refused to throw awaymoney on submarines so long as they could only cruise in home waters.”15
This seems a bit disingenuous, given he was in a very good position from which to influence the pace
of technological advance. By 1914, he had ten U-boats of sufficient range, thanks to their diesel engines,
and with powerful enough “punch,” in terms of the number of torpedoes they could carry,16 to be con-
sidered serious threats. Eighteen other boats, gas-powered, could also range beyond coastal waters.17
But Germany could have had far more U-boats at the start of the war, as the great firmMaschinenfabrik
Augsburg-Nürnberg had already perfected 300-horsepower diesel engines by 1906—eight years before
the outbreak of war. Had Tirpitz emphasized submarines instead of dreadnoughts, the campaign against
British commerce would have started much sooner, and been far more deadly.
Tirpitz’s High Sea Fleet mostly stayed in port during the war, but his submarines nearly won it; so per-
haps there is something of a prima facie case to be made against his initial strategic choice to emphasize
building all-big-gun battleships. To this point must be added the failure of his investment in far-flung
cruiser groups, like the Graf von Spee’s East Asia Squadron. After transiting the Pacific, the squadron
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enjoyed its lone major success against an inferior British force at Coronel off the Chilean coast, only to
be annihilated at the Battle of the Falkland Islands in December 1914. Then there were the lone sur-
face raiders, most of which were hunted down early in the war, thanks to radio alarms sent by merchant
ships under attack that still had time to give away these predators’ whereabouts. As Paul Halpern has
noted of the lone raiders’ overall results, “[t]he losses they inflicted were nowhere near the losses inflicted
by the U-boats.”18 Indeed, by war’s end, surface raiders had accounted for Allied merchant ship losses
totaling only 620,000 tons overall. U-boats, on the other hand, sank well in excess of 13,000,000 tons of
shipping.
The foregoing simply piles on the criticism and seemingly makes an even stronger case that Tirpitz
should have emphasized submarine development. But the kaiser and his state secretary for naval affairs
were much in thrall to the ideas of Alfred T. Mahan, the great American apostle of sea power who held
that “command of the sea” via decisive battle, the guerre d’escadre, was superior to darting about chasing
commerce in a guerre de course. These views were cemented in the kaiser’s mind during a dinner that
Mahan attended on the royal yacht Hohenzollern in 1893. As Barbara Tuchman noted, this encounter
firmedup the kaiser’s ideas about naval expansion and the importance of a battlefleet that could challenge
directly for sea control.19
As toTirpitz’s absorption ofMahan’s ideas, the eminent strategist Bernard Brodie observed that hewas
devoted to Mahan’s maxims about sea power, and “stubbornly opposed the adoption of the submarine
by the German Navy.” This remained the case for years after 1914, as Brodie also noted: “The Germans
themselves never realized the tremendous potentialities of the submarine until the war was well under
way.”20
Brodie was right to refer to “Germans” plural, as Tirpitz was hardly alone in his dismissive attitude
toward the U-boats. For senior officers, a submarine war meant seeing most of the combat units com-
manded by junior officers—whereas the major fleet components called for more senior commanders,
captains, and admirals. The latter were to their organizational preference. And while, as the war pro-
gressed, there was grudging acceptance of the value of the U-boats, there was still concern about their
gaining too much of a place in German naval affairs.
A telling example comes from a statement of Admiral von Capelle, who succeeded Tirpitz. He com-
mented in January 1917—some two-and-a-half years into the war—that “we have already discussed in
the Navy Office … creating after the war a special cemetery for our existing submarines.”21 Thus, what-
ever their war-winning potential value, the U-boats were simply not to be allowed to stand in the way of
senior naval officers’ preferences.
Besides, for all their many merits, the U-boats had a serious downside as well, in that an energetic,
and ultimately unrestricted, submarine campaign—that is, one in which all ships in the conflict zone
were de facto seen as fair game—was bound to irritate the Americans enough, as their losses mounted,
to bring them into the war against Germany. Also, focusing on building U-boats might have prompted
a British response of adding far more escort vessels and “rediscovering” convoys much sooner than was
done.
Yes, in response to this Tirpitz might well have built more and better submarines, and if they had had
to confront convoys, the Germans might even have begun using wolf-pack tactics. Indeed, the first wolf
pack of eight U-boats was unleashed along a major convoy route in May 1918—one year after the first
Allied trial convoy set sail from Gibraltar.22
But the grand strategic conundrum would still not go away: the more a submarine war against com-
merce succeeded, the more likely the Americans would come into the war against Germany. Early. And
the presence of large numbers of U.S. troops on the western front in, say, 1915 or 1916, would have been
potentially disastrous for theGermans. The only way to offset this looming interventionwould have been
to starve the British out before America’s military weight couldmake itself felt. The Germans couldn’t do
this in the actual course of the war, despite the fact that large-size U.S. contingents only began to appear
and be fully ready for battle in 1918.
With many more U-boats, perhaps the Germans could have made the war a more “near-run thing.”
Still, it is hard to rest a case against Tirpitz based on counterfactual speculations about the possible timing
of an American entry into the war.
COMPARATIVE STRATEGY 147
In fact, there may even be a very strong rebuttal case to make in his defense. For Tirpitz did build
a magnificent battle fleet. His warships’ weapons could achieve greater penetrativity than those of the
Royal Navy. German optics were superior. Tirpitz armored his ships’ decks against the plunging fire of
long-range gunnery duels, and conceived awatertight compartment schema thatmade the dreadnoughts
of the High Sea Fleet very hard to sink. And at the Battle of Jutland, where the Germans were outnum-
bered in dreadnoughts by nearly 2:1—twenty-eight to fifteen—they nevertheless inflicted much more
damage than they suffered. The Royal Navy lost three battle cruisers, three heavy cruisers, and eight
destroyers. High Sea Fleet losses were just one battle cruiser, four light cruisers, a pre-dreadnought, and
five destroyers. Six thousand British sailors died; the Germans lost less than half that number.23 Tirpitz
certainly delivered on tactical quality.
Of course, it can be argued that Tirpitz’s basic error was in thinking that quality would trump quantity.
In this belief he was proved wrong, as the High Sea Fleet simply had too few capital ships to keep up the
competition with the Royal Navy—despite the former’s tactical victory at Jutland. Thus, the fleet seldom
ventured out again during the last two years of the war, and turned tail when pursued during its few
sorties.
If Tirpitz’s fleet couldn’t fight for the long haul, and had little hope of ending the British “distant block-
ade” of Germany—which meant the Royal Navy didn’t have to fight the High Sea Fleet to achieve its
strategic aims—then perhaps the Germans should have sortied earlier, say in the opening days of the
war when the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was making its way to France.
If the High Sea Fleet had engaged at sea in August 1914, it would have faced the Grand Fleet onmuch
better numerical terms, as the British had several dreadnoughts in dock, and some were deployed far
off. Holger Herwig has noted that the High Sea Fleet would have had “no difficulty disposing of the …
Anglo-French Channel Fleet,” and so could have blocked deployment of the BEF, though the Germans
would likely have had to engage the Grand Fleet on the way back.24 An early “Jutland” would have taken
place off the Belgian or Dutch coast.
However such a confrontation might have turned out, it certainly would have been highly disruptive
to the BEF transit effort. And without the British Army available from Mons to the Marne during the
opening month of the war, it is very hard to see how the French could have slowed the German advance
and defended successfully against the onslaught carried out, so nearly to victory, under the Schlieffen
Plan. As John Terraine summed up matters so succinctly: “It was the advance of the 5th [French] Army
and the BEF … that made the Battle of the Marne a decisive battle of the war, and forced the Germans
back.”25
Why, then, did Tirpitz not push for swift action by the High Sea Fleet? Certainly British leaders were
deeply concerned. As Robert Massie has observed,
the Admiralty did not know what to expect: a surface attack by German destroyers into the Channel to savage the
transports; a concentrated submarine assault on the vessels crowded with soldiers; or a massive challenge to the
Grand Fleet by the dreadnoughts of the High Sea Fleet.”26
Tirpitz himself noted in retrospect that he should indeed have “risked the risk fleet”: “It is with almost
unbearable sorrow that I can now think of the world-wide difference that would have been produced
had a sea battle been fought to a decision in the early months of the war.”27
Given that his High Sea Fleet did so well almost two years later—against much greater numerical
odds—one can only assume that Tirpitz’s lament was sincere. A tactical naval victory over the Grand
Fleet was just as likely in August 1914, perhaps even more likely. The eminent naval historian Arthur
Marder concluded, of the High Sea Fleet’s chances, that “the prospects of German success were greatest
in the first months.”28 And the strategic consequences would have been profoundly greater at the outset
of the war.
Kaiser Wilhelm has been given much of the blame for the lack of initiative shown by German surface
naval forces and, to be sure, he too was reluctant to risk the risk fleet. But he understood the strategic
importance of an early naval confrontation, based on his reading of Mahan. On August 8, 1914, just a
week into the war, the Kaiser actually sent an order to the High Sea Fleet to prepare to intercept the BEF
as it began its transit to France.
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However, the kaiser quickly countermanded this order in thewake of his receiving a quite oddmessage
from the General Staff that German field armies could “handle” the BEF.29 Even so, Wilhelm was still
itching for a sea battle. And at a lunch with senior naval officials the following week, at the very time the
BEF was in the process of being transported to France, he asked again whether the High Sea Fleet might
sortie to interdict this movement of troops—even though the British Grand Fleet would likely force a
major battle. Admiral Müller, chief of Germany’s naval cabinet at this time, recorded in his diary that
Tirpitz was worried about ship losses, and argued forcefully against sending the battleships out, with
this excuse: “It would be highly desirable that, at the eventual peace discussions, we should [still] be
in possession … of the fleet.”30 Thus, the architect of German naval expansion took the position that
keeping a fleet “in being” trumped taking action.
Risk aversion was not the only reason why there was little pressure to engage at sea early on. German
naval leaders were operating with a firm belief that the Royal Navy would open the war in a classic
Nelsonian manner, swooping down upon them near the German coast. This belief was consistent
with their prewar concerns that the Royal Navy would “Copenhagen” them—a reference to British
uses of preventive force against the Danish Navy during the Napoleonic era.31 Ironically, the British
fear of German light forces—torpedo boats and mines, in particular—led senior leadership initially to
recommend deploying the Grand Fleet far to the north, well out of range of such deadly wasps, and yet
still able, from a great distance, to maintain a blockade that would ultimately strangle the war-making
capacities of the kaiser’s minions.32
The German imperative, given the massive investment made in building the dreadnoughts—just
under half a billion marks in the first navy bill, with no spending ceiling (!) on the second bill33—was
to force a decisive battle. Conversely, the British could enjoy full benefits of sea control and blockade
without forcing a fight.
This seeming British strategic diffidence hardly went unnoticed and, despite Tirpitz’s own reluctance
to send the High Sea Fleet out to interdict the BEF, some naval staffers did engage in discussions about
attacking in the Channel during the BEF transit period.When this possibility was finally brought directly
toHelmuth vonMoltke (the Younger),34 chief of the GermanGeneral Staff, he “coolly informed theNavy
that he desired no actions in the Channel, preferring instead to mop up Sir John French’s Expeditionary
Force along with the French Army.”35
This is entirely consistent with Gerhard Ritter’s assessment of Army Chief of Staff Alfred von Schli-
effen’s attitude, a decade earlier, regarding the carrying out of his eponymous plan: “Schlieffen had not
the least use for the German Navy.”36 Thus, the decision to set the fleet loose would have to be taken by
the kaiser; but the dead-hand guidance of the “other Alfred” (von Schlieffen, who died in 1913) was an
admonition not to engage.
Assessing Tirpitz’s technology strategy—and some that followed
With the foregoing in mind, can one still make a good case that Tirpitz actually did build the right kind
of fleet? One made up of better battleships that could contest for sea control, and whose actions would
not antagonize the Americans the way that U-boats did? One that, used boldly, could have helped win
the war in the autumn of 1914?
Yes, this is still a reasonable case. It suggests that Tirpitz invested well and wisely the resources
entrusted to him, but also affirms the cautionary point that the correctness of any given technology
strategy is heavily determined by the concept of operations that is developed for its intended use. Tools
alone are not enough; appropriate practices must be identified as well.
And in this case, the proper use of theHigh Sea Fleet was to have it sortie early to participate in attacks
in the Channel against the transiting BEF, then to face the Grand Fleet as and if necessary. The primary
purpose of Tirpitz’s “risk fleet” was to deter Britain from entering the war. In this it failed; but with the
failure of deterrence should have come a willingness to send the High Sea Fleet into action. A willingness
that Tirpitz could not muster; he was unready, so early in the war, to court such risk.
Winston Churchill famously said that British Admiral John Jellicoe was the only man on either side
who could “lose the war in an afternoon.” Perhaps the corollary is that Tirpitz was the only man who
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could have won it in an afternoon. But that afternoon should have been in August 1914, not twenty-two
months later. The Kaiser asked Tirpitz the right question, at that early luncheonmeeting a fewweeks into
the war, about whether to send the fleet into action. The British rightly feared that the battleships of the
High Sea Fleet, along with a swarm of U-boats and torpedo boats, could come to disrupt the deployment
of the BEF and then engage the Grand Fleet. But Tirpitz took the counsel of his fears, argued against
such a bold move, and by this inaction fatally undermined his carefully crafted, decades-in-the-making
technology strategy.
It is interesting to note that the German approach to naval affairs in the interwar period—really just in
the 1930s, given that the constraints of the Treaty of Versailles were followed until after Hitler’s accession
to power, and only repudiated in 1935—showed difficulty grasping the nuances of technology strategy
yet again. Once more, there was an emphasis on building a small number of high-quality capital ships:
large battleships, the Bismarck and the appropriately named Tirpitz;the battle cruisers Scharnhorst and
Gneisenau;and the pocket battleshipsGraf von Spee, Scheer, and Hipper—these last three were all named
for naval heroes of the Great War, and reflect, it seems, a mindset still steeped in old strategic thinking.
As to U-boats, the Germans entered World War II in 1939 with forty-five in service, not many more
than the twenty-eight they had in 1914. Once again, their surface ships—used mostly individually and
most of the time as commerce raiders—achieved little, while U-boats very nearly won the war at sea.37
Technology strategy is clearly an art tough to master.
That said, it is also fascinating to observe that the next great naval challenge, which came from
the Soviet Union during the Cold War, was led by an innovative admiral, the aforementioned
Sergei Gorshkov, who was quite fully in tune with the strategic implications of post-war techno-
logical advances. Instead of emulating the carrier-centric U.S. Navy, he focused on building sub-
marines and a range of small missile boats. Gorshkov strongly embraced what naval strategist Wayne
Hughes once called the “submarine’s guerrilla warfare against shipping.” In Gorshkov’s eyes, as Hughes
noted, the true assessment of the German U-boat campaign in World War II was that it should
“be called a strategic success because of the vast and disproportionate response imposed on the
Allies.”38
The Russian Navy that survived the dissolution of the Soviet Union became just a shadow of its for-
mer self during the 1990s, but has been revived—along lines that Admiral Gorshkov would no doubt
approve—during the Putin era. At the same time, China has been rising as a premier naval power; and
though it purchased a tumble-down Kuznetzov-class aircraft carrier from Ukraine—one of two of this
class in the world—and has launched another of its own design since, it seems quite clear that the PLA
Navy is thinking much more along Gorshkov’s lines than about emulating the American naval model of
sea power based on a relatively small number of carrier strike groups.
Thus technology strategy in two of the most important navies in the world has veered far from the
imitative, follow-the-leading-navy approach that Tirpitz chose, and hasmovedmuch closer to themodel
of “guerrilla warfare at sea” with small, lethally-armed vessels as an alternative model. And in the Chi-
nese case, there is a well-developed concept of operations to go with the hundreds of missile and torpedo
boats, the brilliant mines, the supersonic anti-ship missiles, and the super-cavitation torpedoes that now
form the leading edge of this kind of naval warfare. It is a concept much like the vision crafted by the
nineteenth-century French Jeune École, which held that navies comprised of many small combatant ves-
sels could overwhelm those fleets that were designed tomass their firepower in a relatively small number
of big capital ships.39
Lessons from Tirpitz for today
It seems that the French naval perspective from the nineteenth century informs and guides today’s
twenty-first-century naval challengers far more than Tirpitz’s capital ship–oriented technology strategy.
With the resurgent naval forces of Russia and the current approach being followed by the PLA Navy
in mind, perhaps a last look is merited to try to figure out why Tirpitz chose to imitate the design of
the Royal Navy instead of pursuing a more wholly innovative path. He was intent on building a fleet
virtually from scratch, but rather than focusing on and exploiting the disruptive naval technologies of
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his day—submarines, torpedoes, and mines—along the lines developed by the French Jeune École, he
emphasized battleships, sparking an arms race that he knew simply could not be won. Not quantitatively.
Yes, he made quite clear in his memoirs that he believed strongly that better quality could overcome a
numerical disadvantage—but when the moment to test this belief came, he demurred. The rest, as they
say, is history.
All of which highlights the importance of picking the right technology strategy, and conforming to
the doctrinal implications of that strategy. This is where Tirpitz failed. From the moment it became clear
that the High Sea Fleet would not deter British entry into the war on the Continent, Tirpitz should have
angled to have his naval forces engage the British Grand Fleet. And, for all the reasons discussed above,
August 1914 was the right moment—something that, as noted earlier, Tirpitz finally acknowledged in
his memoirs. Too late.
Today, the United States is the world’s leading naval power, a position to some degree analo-
gous to that of Britain in the years before World War I. Back then, the principal challenger chose
to emphasize an imitative technology strategy, making the British choice of a course of action easy:
keep building dreadnoughts. Now, however, the United States and its allies face two major potential
naval challengers, neither of which is simply pursuing an imitative approach. It is as though latter-day
Tirpitzes in Russia and China have both decided upon strategies derived from the Jeune École. And
the Chinese in particular seem to be marrying their massive investment in small, swift vessels and
smart weapons to an edgy, aggressive naval policy in the East and South China Seas. Thus, according
to the terms of reference used in this essay, it seems that the PLA Navy has been acquiring useful
tools that go well with the innovative practices first imagined and identified two decades ago by
Shen et al.40
In short, the future of sea power is very much in play; and in an era of rapid, radical technologi-
cal change, the advantage will surely go to the side that marries good technology strategy to the right
doctrine. It is important to note, though, that these unfolding events in naval affairs have hardly gone
unnoticed in American strategic circles. Indeed, the possibility that major U.S. Navy vessels are likely
to have to confront swarms of high-speed missiles and torpedoes in the future has sparked some very
deep thinking about how to counter the growing threat of hostile swarms—perhaps even by deploying
“counter-swarms” of our own, comprised of small unmanned aerial systems.41 As to the ever more dis-
persed battle arrays being developed by potential naval rivals, the emerging vision of “distributed lethal-
ity” appears to be a practical concept of operations—relying on networking the spread-out firepower of
widely dispersed naval platforms—that holds the potential to meet and master challenges of this sort.42
Clearly, a century after Tirpitz grappled with technology strategy, this notion of identifying the right
tools and linking them to appropriate practices continues to pose a challenge of deep and continuing
importance to naval affairs. For the U.S. Navy, its competitors, and for a world still so dependent upon
sea power as a guarantor of commercial prosperity and systemic order. The most important point to
remember is that the technology strategy chosen should bewell integratedwith the concept of operations
for its use. Tirpitz’s story is one of great technical achievement in building sharp new tools of sea power—
but of failing to employ the best practices for their employment. Today’s rising sea powers appear to be
matching tools and practices quite cleverly. May the still-leading sea power—the United States—show
similar wisdom.
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